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DEFEASANCE AS A RESTRICTIVE DEVICE IN MICHIGAN* 
William F. Fratchert 
QUITE apart from any question of their validity, the imposition of use restrictions by means of a prohibition was not practicable 
before the development of equitable remedies because the common 
law afforded no method of enforcing such a prohibition. One who 
conveyed land in violation of a prohibition on alienation might at-
tempt to enforce the prohibition by attacking the validity of his own 
conveyance but one who violated a prohibition on use had neither 
motive nor method for challenging his own acts. Hence attempts to 
restrict use by common law devices are necessarily confined to pen-
alty restraints and to limitations on the interest, as distinct from the 
activities, of the user. The real covenant, as enforced at common law, 
is a penalty restraint; the easement is a limitation on the interest of 
the user. Defeasance by condition subsequent is a penalty restraint; 
defeasance by special limitation is ordinarily a limitation on the inter-
est of the user; defeasance by executory limitation may be both. 
A condition subsequent is a provision in a conveyance, separate 
from the granting clause, which empowers the conveyor to reenter 
and terminate the estate conveyed upon the happening of a designated 
event.1 The interest retained by the conveyor is known as a right of 
entry or power of termination on condition broken.2 An example of 
a conveyance upon condition subsequent is one by which Andrew 
Baker conveys to John Stiles and his heirs, "Provided, that if the land 
conveyed shall ever be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor, then 
the said Andrew Baker and his heirs may reenter and terminate the 
estate hereby conveyed." A special limitation is a provision of the 
granting clause of a conveyance limiting the duration of the estate 
conveyed to the period prior to the happening of a designated future 
event,3 for example, a conveyance from Andrew Baker to John Stiles 
"' The writer is mdebted to Professor Lewis M. Simes of the University of Michigan 
Law Faculty for guidance and advice in the preparation of this article. It is closely related 
to the writer's earlier articles, ''Restramts on Alienation of Legal Interests fu Michigan 
Property," 50 MICH. L. Rnv. 675-736, 793-836, 1017-1046 (1952), and ''Restramts on 
Alienation of Equitable Interests in Michigan Property," 51 Mrc:s:. L. Rnv. 509-552 (1953). 
These articles are cited in subsequent footnotes as ''Restramts." 
t Professor of Law, University of Missouri.-Ed. 
11 CoKB, !NSTITaTES "'201-202 (1628). 
21 SIMSs, I.Aw oF Fanmn hmmESTs 281-282 (1936); PnoPBR'l.Y R:sSTATBMENT 
§24, comment b (1936). The tenn "power of tennination," used by the Restatement, is 
not a happy one because the old law made a shatp distinction between a condition subse-
quent, which was permissible in a common law conveyance, and a power of revocation, 
which could be used only in a conveyance operating under the Statute of Uses. 1 CoKB, 
INsnnrrns 237a (1628). 
3 GRAY, RtILE AGAINST l'ERPETOI'l'IES, 3d ed., §32 (1915); PROP.BR'l.Y R:sSTATBMENT 
§23 (1936). 
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and his heirs "so long as the said land shall not be used for the sale 
of intoxicating liquor," or, "until the said land is used for the sale of 
intoxicating liquor." If the conveyance is in fee simple, the interest 
retained by the conveyor is Imown as a possibility of reverter.4 An 
exec~tory limitation is usually one which creates a shifting use or -a-
shiftfug executory devise, both of which interests are commonly Imown 
as executory interests. A shifting use is created by a conditional limita- . 
tion, that is, a provision in a conveyance operating under the Statute 
of Uses that, upon the happening of a designated future event, the 
use shall shift from the immediate conveyee to another.5 For ex-
ample, a conveyance from Andrew Baker to James Thorpe and his 
heirs to the use of John Stiles and his heirs ''but if the said land shall 
be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor, then to the use of Roger 
White and his heirs." A shifting executory devise is created by a 
similar provision in a will. 6 Rights of entry on condition broken, 
possibilities of reverter and executory interests were, under the older 
law, heritable but not alienable.7 The rule of inalienability has been 
relaxed to some extent in modem law8 but these interests are still per-
sonal in the sense that they are not appurtenant to other land. 
The condition subsequent was the £rst of these devices to be de-
veloped. and, consequently, the authorities as to its possibilities are 
more complete than those as to the other three. In the thirteenth 
century the condition su'f?sequent was a common device for enforcing 
the payment of money. The common law mortgage took the form 
of a conveyance by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, in fee or of some 
lesser estate, upon condition that if the mortgagor should repay the 
mortgage debt, he or his heirs might reenter and terminate the estate 
of the mortgagee.9 Similarly a · conveyance in fee simple reserving a 
4 l Su.ms, I.Aw OF FOTIJltB INTERESTS 24 (1936); PitoPER'lY R:ssrATBl\U!Nr §23, 
illus. 4 (1936). Professor Gray and some other writers have thought that the statute 
Quia Emptores Terram,n [18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290)] precludes the existence of such 
an interest after a fee simple but posSI"bilities of reverter have been recognized by the 
courts. See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPnTtllTills §§31-37; CB:ALLis, I.Aw OF RnAr. PROP· 
ER'lY, 3d ed., 437-439 (1911); Powell, ''Determinable Fees," 23 CoL, L. Rnv. 207-234 
(1923); Vance, "Rights of Reverter and the Statute Quia Emptores," 36 YALU L.J. 593-
607 (1927); Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 SoL. J. 213 (Lanes. Ch. 1944), noted, 
62 L.Q. Rnv. 222 (1946). 
51 Sll'.Dls, I.Aw oF Ftl'TIDlE INnllESTs 269 (1936). Professor Gray and others refer 
to the interest itself as a conditional limitation. GRAY, ROI.E AGAml'fr P.BRPETOITmS §32. 
The Restatement of Property denominates it an executocy limitation. Sec. 25 (1936). 
6 Note 5 supra. 
71 CoKE, lNSnTaTBs *214a (1628); ''Restraints," 50 M:mn. L. Rnv. 827, note 359 
(1952). 
s ''Restraints," 50 MICR. L. R:sv. 827, 829, 830, notes 359, 371, 374 (1952). 
91.rrr.u;.ToN, TENtIIms §332 (1481). 
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rent charge might provide that, if the rent was in default, the con-
veyor might reenter and terminate the estate conveyed.10 A provi-
sion in a lease for life or years for forfeiture on non-payment of rent 
then was, and still is, common. It will be observed that such conditions 
designed to enforce the payment of money do not in any way regu-
late the enjoyment or restrict the use of the land conveyed. 
Restrictions on Legal Estates of Inheritance 
As in the case of direct restraints on alienation, attempts were made 
in the mediaeval period to impose restrictions on the use of land by 
means of conditions subsequent. Conditions subsequent in general 
restraint of alienation in conveyances in fee simple were early held to 
be invalid upon two grounds, (l) that the statute Quia Emptores T er-
raru,m prohibited the retention of a reversion after a fee simple, and 
(2) that such a condition restrained the exercise of an essential incident 
of an estate in fee simple and so was repugnant to the grant.11 At-
tempts to impose use restrictions on land incident to a conveyance in 
fee simple, by means of conditions subsequent, met a similar analysis 
by the courts and the same fate. A condition in such a conveyance 
that the conveyee should not take the pro.6.ts,12 cut trees13 or commit 
waste14 was void and the conveyee took an indefeasible estate.15 Like-
lOid., §325. 
11Id., §360. "Restraints," 50 Mxar. L. Ibrv. 701, 702, 703, notes 108, II5, 121, 122 
(1952). . 
12Fitz-Hugh v. Comewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, Trln., pl. 21 (Exch. Ch. 1429); Anony-
mous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Trln., pl. 15 (1506); Puseto's Case, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Mich., 
pl. IO (1506); 1 Co:im, lNSTrrOTBs *206b (1628); P.aBXINs, PROPITAJ3LB Boox:s §731 
(1642); SHBPPAIU>, TonCHSToNE oF Cor.:cru:oN AsstmANCES 131 (1648). See EylifE v. 
Chopley, 1 Bulst. 42, 80 Eng. Rep. 746 (1610); Sir Edward Coke's Case, Godbolt 289, 78 
Eng. Rep. 169 at 175 (1623). So, iE land is devised in fee simple or personalty bequeathed 
absolutely, a provjso that the devisee or legatee shall not enjoy the property until he :reaches 
a stipulated age is void. EylifE v. Chopley, supm; Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 
Eng. Rep. 282 (1841), affd. 1 Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841); Gosling v. 
Gosling, Joh. 265, 70 Eng. Rep. 423 (1859); Harbin v. Masterman, [1894] 2 Ch. 184, 
affd., sub nom. Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] AC. 186. 
13 See Earl of Pembroke's Case, Jenk. 266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597); 
Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1614). 
14 SHBPPAIU>, TonCHSTONE oP CoMMON AsstntANCEs 131 (1648); P.BIUaNs, PROFIT-
AJ3LB Boo:im §731 (1642). See Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21, BRoo:im, 
GRAUNDB AimmcBMBNT, "Conditions," pl. 57 (1442). Cf. Earl of Pembroke's Case, Jenk. 
266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597); Sir Anthony Milclmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 
40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 314 (1605); Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. 
Rep. 976 at 982 (1613); Jervis v. Bruton, 2 Vernon 251, 23 Eng. Rep. 762 (1691); Turner 
v. Wright, 2 DeG., F. & J. 234, 45 Eng. Rep. 612 (1860). As the statute Quia Emptcres 
Terrarum did not apply to the sovereign it would seem that the Crown can convey in fee 
simple subject to a valid condition :requiring the tenant to keep the premises in :repair. See 
Flower v. Hartopp, 6 Beav. 476, 49 Eng. Rep. 910 (1843). Cf. 1 Co:im, lNSTrrOTBS 
*223a (1628). 
151 Co:im, lNsnnm!s *206b (1628). See Fitz-Hugh v. Comewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, 
Trin., pl. 21 (1429). 
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wise, a condition in an otherwise absolute conveyance of standing tim-
ber, that it be removed within a stipulated period, was invalid.16 
The sum of the old decisions makes it clear that the condition sub-
sequent could not be used as a device for imposing use restrictions on 
a fee simple in private ownership. It should not be usable for that 
purpose in modem law.17 Such a condition violates the principles 
of the fixed scheme of estates established in the thirteenth century 
by depriving the gr~atest estate lmown to the law, the fee simple, of 
essential incidents. It is also wrong in principle and objectionable in 
practice for other reasons. There can be no social justification for re-
stricting the development and use of land by its possessor except for 
the protection of the community, the owner of another estate in the 
same land, or the owner of other land in the vicinity. Community 
protection is a function of government. Since the enactment of Quia 
Emptores Terrarum, one who conveys in fee simple cannot retain 
an estate in the land conveyed. Even if the conveyor does own other 
land in the vicinity which would be benefited by the restriction, the 
condition subsequent is not a proper or effective device for protecting 
other land because it is not and cannot be made appurtenant to the 
benefited land.18 As has been seen, the right of entry on breach of 
condition is personal to the conveyor and, under the older law, not only 
did not pass with a conveyance of the benefited land but could not be 
conveyed to a purchaser of the benefited land. Moreover, if a conveyor 
can restrict the use of land conveyed in fee simple by means of a 
condition subsequent, for the benefit of land which he retains, the con-
dition would operate as an indirect restraint on alienation of the re-
tained land also because that land would not be as valuable in the 
hands of a purchaser who could not enforce the condition as it was in 
the hands of the owner of the right of entry. 
Another feature of the condition subsequent which makes it in-
appropriate as a device for imposing restrictions on the use of land held 
in fee simple is that, so soon as it is enforced, it ceases to restrict. For 
example, if Andrew Baker may convey land to John Stiles and his heirs 
upon an effective conditio_n that intoxicating liquors not be sold on the 
premises, a breach of the condition followed by entry by the heir of 
Andrew will destroy the condition itself as well as the estate of John. 
The heir of Andrew will be free to use the land as the site of a saloon; 
indeed, his purpose in entering may be to take advantage of the fact 
that the land is now valuable chiefly for that purpose. TJ:ms the con-
10 Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1614). 
17 Cm!sBIRB, Mo»BBN I.Aw OP REAL PnoPBRfi, 6th ed., 522-523 (1949). 
1s3 WALSH, CoM:MBN'rARIBS oN nm LA.w oP REAL PRoPBRn 39-40 (1947). 
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dition is worthless for the protection of the community or of neighbor-
ing land unless the holder of the right of entry happens to own land 
in the vicinity, the likelihood of which eventuality is reduced by the 
personal, non-appurtenant character of rights of entry. 
Perhaps the most seriously objectionable feature of the condition 
subsequent as a device for imposing use restrictions is that the right of 
entry is a legal property interest which is not cut off or affected by 
change of circumstances. Courts of equity will not grant specific per-
formance of real covenants restricting use or enforce equitable servi-
tudes after the purpose of the restriction has ceased or change in the 
character of the neighborhood has made enforcement inequitable. Con-
ditions subsequent require no equitable remedy for enforcement; in-
deed, if the holder of the right of entry can exercise it peaceably, they-
require no judicial enforcement at all. Hence they may be enforced 
after changes in the neighborhood have made the enforcement of the 
restriction absurd by a holder of a right of entry who has no intention 
of confining his use to that permitted by the condition. This being so, 
the condition subsequent has much more tendency to prevent the 
development and use of land in the manner most suitable under cur-
rent economic and social conditions than have the real covenant and 
the equitable servitude.19 _ 
The rule of nullity of conditions in general restraint of alienation 
of estates in fee simple had an exception in the case of restraints on 
types of alienation which would be wrongful apart from the condi-
tion.20 Thus, as a public or charitable corporation has no legal right 
to alienate lands conveyed to it for public or charitable purposes,21 a 
condition against alienation in a conveyance to such a corporation is 
valid.22 The same principle is applicable to use restrictions. As a 
public or charitable corporation or the trustee of a charitable trust may 
not rightfully use lands for other than the public or charitable pur-
pose for which they are conveyed to it or him, a condition restricting 
the land to such uses does not deprive the estate conveyed of any 
incident which it would otherwise have. Even so, the enforcement 
of such a condition in a conveyance in fee simple seems, on :first ex-
amination, to violate the rule laid down by the statute Quia Emptores 
10 Id. at 40-44. There are, however, a vezy few decisions refusing to enforce condi-
tions subsequent because of changed circumstances. Goldstein, ''Rights of Entry and 
Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land," 54 HARv. L. REv. 248 at 
266-275 (1940). 
20 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28, BnooKB, GRAUND:E .AnRIDGEMEN'l', 
"Conditions," pl. 239 (1494); "Restraints," 50 MICH. L. REv. 701, 731 (1952). 
21 ''Restraints," 50 MICH. L. REv. 731, note 219 (1952). 
22 ''Restraints," 50 MICH. L. REv. 732, note 222 (1952). 
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T errarum that there cannot be a reversion expectant upon a fee simple. 
As has been seen, however, that rule does not prevent conditions sub-
sequent designed to secure the payment of money or some other bene-
fit to the conveyor collateral to and not touching or conceming the 
land conveyed; It is arguable that the founder of a charity has a benefit 
from the continued operation of the charity quite distinct from any 
retained interest in the land conveyed.28 Moreover, as the real bene-
ficiaries of a charitable disposition of property are an indefinite group 
of unascertained and unbom persons, their interest is contingent in 
some sense. It has long been settled that one who conveys land upon 
contingent uses retains a reversion by way of resulting use so long as 
the uses remain contingent.24 It is, perhaps, for this reason that, when 
the specific charitable purpose of a trust becomes impossible of accom-
plishment and no general charitable intent is present, there is a re-
sulting trust for the settlor.25 Thus, upon further examination, it 
appears that charitable dispositions do differ, for purposes of the prob-
lem at hand, from ordinary conveyances in fee simple to private 
persons. In any event, it would seem that a condition subsequent in 
an otherwise absolute transfer for public or charitable purposes, de-
signed to restrict the use of the property transferred to the designated 
purposes, is valid.26 This exception to the general rule that condi-
tions subsequent may not be used to impose use restrictions on land 
held in fee simple has been greatly limited by modem English 
decisions that, even in a conveyance to a charity, a condition subsequent 
is void unless the event which will entitle the conveyor to enter must 
happen, if at all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.27 
It appearing, then, that the law of England does not permit the 
use of defeasance by condition subsequent in a conveyance in fee 
23 That the early cases permitted the heir of the settlor of a charitable trust to sue in 
equity to enforce the trust is indicative of this. 1 Cal. Proc. Ch. 56 (1456). 
24 Plunket v. Holmes, Raym. Sir T. 28, 83 Eng. Rep. 15 (1661); Purefoy v. Rogers, 
2 Wms. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671); Carter v. Bamadiston, 1 P. Wms. 505, 
24 Eng. Rep. 492 (1718). See Lodington v. Kime, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 183, 21 Eng. Rep. 
974 (1697); 1 FE.ulN:B, CoNTJNGm.T REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 360-364 (1844); 1 SIMES, 
I.Aw OF FtJTaRB lNTBru!STS §45 (1936); Pratcher, ''Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only 
Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 MICH. L. REv. 907 at 925-926 (1949), 
25 In re British Red Cross Balkan Fund, [1914] 2 Ch. 419; In re Stanford, [1924] 
l'Ch. 73. 
20 Walsh v. Secretary of State for India, IO H.L.C. 367 (1863); Re Robinson, [1897] 
1 Ch. 85 (C.A.); Re Macnamara, 104 L.T.·771 (1911). Cf. Attorney-General v. Pyle, 1 
Atk. 435, 26 Eng. Rep. 278 (1738); In re Randell, 38 Ch. D. 213 (1888); In re Blunt's 
Trusts, [1904] 2 Ch. 767. 
27Jn re Trustees of Hollis' Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540; In re Da Costa, [1912] I Ch. 
337; Re Peel's Release, [1921] 2 Ch. 218. See In re Macleay, L.R. 20 Eq. 186 at 190 
(1875); Dunn v. Flood, 25 Ch. D. 629 at 633 (1882), affd., 28 Ch. D. 586 at 592 (1885). 
American cases c01itra are collected in GRAY, RuLE AGAINST PBRPETUrl".CES, 3d ed., 288· 
298 (1915) and 3 Sco:rr, LAw OF TRUSTS 2127 (1939). 
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simple to a private person, as a device for imposing use restrictions, 
what of defeasance by special limitation or executory limitation? Sir 
Edward Cok<:! appears to have thought that the same rules which 
governed the validity of conditions subsequent applied to special 
limitations, and he probably thought that they also applied to executory 
limitations.28 Mr. Charles Fearne, the leading authority on executory 
limitations, clearly was of the opinion that, whenever a condition 
subsequent would be repugnant to the estate granted, a limitation 
imposing the same restriction would be.29 Indeed, this conclusion is 
logically necessary from the premises upon which the decisions con-
cerning conditions subsequent are based. The objection to a condition 
subsequent against alienation, use or waste is not to the form of the 
penalty but to the fact that any penalty upon the exercise of an essential 
incident of the estate conveyed operates to make that estate one which 
the law will not allow. 
Grave doubt as to the validity of special limitations30 and a judicial 
tendency to construe language as something other than a special limita-
tion have deprived us of English precedents as to the efficacy of that 
device for imposing use restrictions. Two modem English equity 
decisions offer some slight suggestion that an executory limitation 
might be effective where a condition subsequent would not. In one 
it was held that, where land was devised in fee with an executory 
devise over to another if the first devisee died without a surviving 
issue, the first devisee would be prevented by injunction from com-
mitting "equitable waste," that is, injuries to the premises which a 
prudent owner in fee simple absolute would not inflict, such as 
destroying the principal buildings or cutting immature trees.31 In the 
other case, land was devised in fee with an executory devise to another 
if the first devisee died without surviving male issue and a further 
provision that if the first devisee should not occupy the land or should 
fell timber or plough any orchard, meadow or pasture, the land would 
pass to the same executory devisee. The first devisee cut timber and 
28 ! Co:im, !NSTITOTEs "'20la, "'20lb (1628); I Sn.ms, I.Aw oP FtITtnm IN:rmu!STS 
285-286 (1936). Accord, SBEPPAllD, TouCHSToNE OP CoMMoN AssmtANCES 133 (1648). 
20 I F.BARNB, CoNTING'EN'l.' REr.rAINDERS AND Ex:Ectr:rORY DEVISES, 5th ed., "'384 
(1795): "We ar.; further to observe, that there are certain incidents and qualities so 
annexed. to and inherent in certain estates, as to be incapable 0£ being restrained or pro-
hibited by any proviso, condition or limitation; and therefore, where an estate is limited to 
take effect upon any such restrictive condition annexed to a preceding estate, such limitation 
is held to be void and incapable 0£ taking effect at all. I shall instance this in the case 0£ 
an estate-tail; to which the power 0£ suffering a common recovery, and 0£ levying a fine ••• 
is so incident and adherent, that any condition or proviso restraining or prohibiting it, is 
held to be repugnant to the nature 0£ the estate, and therefore void." 
ao Note 4 supra. 
a1 Turner v. Wright, 2 DeG., F., & J. 234, 45 Eng. Rep. 612 (1860). 
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died without surviving male issue. It was held that his estate was 
liable to the executory devisee for the value of the timber.32 Neither 
decision amounted to enforcement of an executory limitation condi-
tioned upon the commission of waste but both cases seem inconsistent 
with the ancient rule that the privilege of committing waste is an 
essential incident of an estate of inheritance. 
As has been seen, in England a right of entry on breach of condi-
tion is void unless the event which is to give rise to the right must 
occur within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.33 Both in 
England and here an executory limitation is void unless the event upon 
which it is conditioned must occur within the period of the rule.84 
The validity of possibilities of reverter expectant upon the expiration of 
estates on special limitation is, however, probably unaffected by the 
Rule Against Perpetuities.35 The invalidity of a condition subsequent 
or an executory limitation does not affect the validity of the estate 
conveyed subject thereto and, indeed, makes that estate indefeasible. 
If a special limitation is invalid it would ·seem that the same result 
should be reached.36 
Although no form of defeasance, even if valid, is a desirable or 
appropriate method of imposing use restrictions on estates in fee 
simple, the executory limitation is the least objectionable of the three 
types of defeasance. Being subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
it cannot be perpetual. Moreover, an executory limitation can be made 
appurtenant to neighboring land in a sense. For example, Andrew 
Baker might convey Blackacre to James Thorpe and his heirs to the 
use of John Stiles and his heirs, "but if, within twenty-one years after 
the death of the survivor of the descendants of Oliva Dionne now 
living, Blackacre shall be used for the sale of intoxicating liquor, then 
to the use of the then owner of Whiteacre and his heirs." 
As to estates in fee tail, any proviso, condition or limitation tending 
32 Blake v. Peters, 1 DeG., J. & S. 345, 46 Eng. Rep. 139 (1863). 
33 Note 27 supra. 
34GRAY, Rur.n AGAINST PERPE-rorrms, 3d ed., §317 (1915); 2 Sn.ms, Lt..w oi, 
Fonnm hr.rmmsTs 363 (1936). 
35 In re Chardon, [1928] 1 Ch. 464; GRAY, Rur.n AGAINST P.ERPErorrms, 3d ed., 
§312 (1915); C!msHIRE, MoDERN LA.w oit REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 520 (1949). Contra, 
Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (Lanes. Ch. 1944), noted, 62 L.Q. 
R:av. 222 (1946). See Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 HARv. L. R:av. 721 at 
740 (1952). The conveyance involved in the Hopper case limited land to trustees for a 
private librai:y society so long as a building thereon was used for the pmposes of the society. 
If the thesis of this article is sound, the language of special limitation might well have been 
held invalid for repugnancy as well as for violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
36 PROPERTY R:asTAT.EMElllT §228, comment a (1936). But see In re Moore, 39 Ch. 
D. 116 (1888); CHBsHIRE, MoDERN LA.w oit REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 521 (1949); 
Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of Illegality," 47 MICH, L. R:av. 759 
at 773 (1949). 
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to impair or penalize the right of the tenant in tail to suffer a common 
recovery or levy a statutory fine was void.37 The old cases make it 
equally clear that any such provision penalizing the tenant in tail for 
using the land38 or committing waste was likewise void.89 Moreover, 
by suffering a common recovery, the tenant in tail. cut off not only 
the interests of the heirs in tail and the reversion or remainder follow-
ing the estate but also all conditions and executory limitations to 
which it was subject.40 This being so, there could be no practically 
effective provision for defeasance in a conveyance in fee tail. 
The early American cases showed a disposition to follow the 
English precedents. In Ne:wkerk-v. Ne:ivkerk41 the New York Supreme 
Court refused to enforce a condition subsequent annexed to a devise 
in fee, requiring the devisees to reside in the village where the land 
Jay, on the ground that it was repugnant. In Hayden -v. Inhabitants 
of Stoughton42 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts enforced 
a condition subsequent annexed to a devise in fee to a town, requiring 
use of the land for a public school, without mention of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. Then that court, seemingly without realizing 
it, made a major departure from the principles of the common law 
which has diverted the whole course of American development. In 
Gray -v. Blanchard43 the plaintiff, who owned no other land in the 
vicinity, conveyed a house and lot in fee simple, subject to a condi-
tion against placing windows in the north wall of the house within 
thirty years. The condition was breached and the plaintiff was 
allowed to recover the land, the court saying, 
"It is next argued, that this condition is void, as being repug-
nant to the grant, restraining the beneficial use of the estate. 
37 ''Restraints," 50 :MrCR. L. R:sv. 691, note 76 (1952). 
38 SEBPPAm>, TouCBSTONB op CoMMON AssuRANcBS 131 (1648). See Fitz-Hugh 
v. Comewall, Y.B. 7 Hen. VI, Trln., pl. 21 (Exch. Ch. 1429); Sir Edward Coke's Case, 
Godbolt 289, 78 Eng. Rep. 169 at 175 (1623). 
39 SEBPPAIU>, TouCBSTONB oP Cor.u.toN AsstmANCEs 131 (1648). See Earl of Pem-
broke's Case, Jenk. 266, pl. 73, note, 145 Eng. Rep. 191 (1597); Sir Anthony l\fildmay's 
Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 314 (1605); Mary Portington's Case, IO Co. 
Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 at 982 (1613). Cf. Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. 
Rep. 316 (1614); Jervis v. Bruton, 2 Vernon 251, 23 Eng. Rep. 762 (1691). 
40 Gulliver ex dem. Corrie v. Ashby, 4 Burr. 1929, 98 Eng. Rep. 4 (1766); 2 FEAmra, 
CoNTJNGBNT R:s:MAINDERS AND ExECUTORY DEVIslls 107 (Powell's note to 4th ed. 1795): 
"But it is established beyond dispute at this day, that all collateral and conditional limita-
tions, and provisoes annexed to an estate tail, may be 'barred 'by a coIDlllon recovery of 
tenant in tail, suffered before the condition or event happens, in which the proviso or con-
ditional limitation is to take effect." 
412 Caine (N.Y.) 345 (1805). 
42 5 Pick. (22 Mass.) 528 (1827). The argument of counsel for plaintiff (p. 530) 
indicates that he considered the condition valid only because the devise was to a public 
coi:poration for charitable pmposes. 
43 8 Pick. (25 Mass.) 284 (1829). Criticized, Loring, "Estates Upon Condition,'' 1 
&t. L. R:av. 265 at 266 (1867). 
514 M:rcmGAN LAw REvmw [Vol. 52 
Without doubt, conditions of the nature supposed are void, and 
the estate is absolute; but the law very clearly defines this rule, 
and the cases cited to support this position show the limitations 
and exceptions to the rule. 
"A lease for two years, provided the lessee occupy but one; 
this is repugnant and senseless, and the proviso shall be rejected. 
Scovell 11. Cabell, Cro. Eliz. 107.44 
"Grant of a house upon condition not to meddle with the 
shops, the shops being part of the house; this is of the same 
nature. Hob. 170.45 
"So a grant of land or rents in fee simple, upon condition that 
the grantee shall not alien, or that his widow shall not have dower; 
these conditions are void, as clearly repugnant to the grant; Shep. 
Touch. 129, 131; for it is of the essence of a fee simple estate, 
that it shall be alienable and subject to dower. 
"But if the condition be that the grantee shall not alien to 
particular persons, or within a reasonable limited period, these 
conditions shall stand, not being inconsistent with the nature of 
the estate granted. Co. Lit. 223. · 
"If one make a feoffment in fee on condition that the feoffee 
shall retain the land for twenty years without interruption, it 
seems this is a good condition and not repugnant. Shep. Touch. 
131.46 A feoffment in fee with a condition that the feoffee shall 
not enjoy the land or take the profits, or that his heirs shall not 
inherit it, or that the feoffee shall do no waste, or that his wife 
shall not be endowed; these are all repugnant and void. Shep. 
Touch. 131. And the same law is of a grant by deed of bargain 
and sale, for by our law this is an entire substitute for a feoffment. 
"But partial and temporary restrictions as to the use, may 
be consistent with the estate granted, and so may stand. 
"A condition in a deed of a house, that there shall be no 
windows in it, or no passage in and out, or that the grantee 
should never occupy or sell it, would come within the rule and 
be void; but that there should be no door or window on one side 
or end, that it should not be sold for several years; or to a par-
44 Cro. Eliz. 89, pl. 13, 107, pl. l, 78 Eng. Rep. 347 at 365 (1589). 
45 Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 at 317 (1614) (dictum). 
46 Sheppard's language is, ''If one make a feoffment of land in fee, on condition that 
the feoffor shall retain the land for twenty years without interruption; it seems this is a 
good condition and not repugnant." This passage is based on Anonymous, 3 Dyer 318b, 
73 Eng. Rep. 721 (1572), which seems to have involved a clumsy attempt to convey a 
springing use to commence twenty years after the date of the deed. By changing "feoffor" 
to "feoffee" in paraphrasing the passage, the Massachusetts court wholly changed its mean· 
ing and made it appear to support the validity of a condition subsequent requiring a grantee 
in fee simple to occupy the land or refrain from alienating his estate. 
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ticular person, would fall within the exception to the rule, and 
form a valid condition."47 
The unsoundness of the court's language as to limited restraints 
on alienation of estates in fee simple has previously been demon-
strated.48 The inconsistency of its decision with the old rules that 
a tenant in fee may not be restrained by condition from cutting trees 
or committing waste is apparent. Nevertheless, Gray 17. Blanchard 
was followed in a number of American decisions49 until, by 1879, the 
United States Supreme Court could say: 
"Repugnant conditions are those which tend to the utter sub-
version of the estate, such as prohibit entirely the alienation or 
use of the property. Conditions which prohibit its alienation to 
particular persons or for a limited period, or its subjection to 
particular uses, are not subversive of the estate: they do not destroy 
or limit its alienable or inheritable character. Sheppard's Touch-
stone, 129, 131. The reports are full of cases where conditions 
imposing restrictions upon the uses to which property conveyed 
in fee may be subjected have been upheld. In this way slaughter-
houses, soap-factories, distilleries, livery-stables, tanneries, and 
machine-shops have, in a multitude of instances, been excluded 
from particular localities, which, thus freed from unpleasant 
sights, noxious vapors, or disturbing noises, have become desirable 
as places for residences of families."50 
In following the decision in Gray 17. Blanchard that conditions 
subsequent restricting use are not ?=epugnant to estates in fee simple, 
American courts have usually overlooked the suggestion in the opinion 
in that case that such conditions are valid only when the restrictions 
are temporary. In the absence of express statutes limiting their dura-
tion, the courts here have tended to treat such conditions as valid even 
47 8 Pick. (25 Mass.) 284 at 289-290 (1829). 
48 "Restraints," 50 MICIL L. lbw. 702-705 (1952). 
49 E.g., Speny's Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387 (1832) (probably a .special limitation); 
Lawrence v. Gilford, 17 Pick. (34 Mass.) 366 (1835); Plumb v. Tubbs, 41 N.Y. 442 
(1869); O'Brien v. Wetherell, 14 Kan. 616 (1875); Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 
55 (1879). See Gillis v. Bailey, 17 N.H. 18 (1845); Craig v. Wells, 11 N.Y. 315 at 322 
(1854); Nicoll v. New York and Erie R.R. Co., 12 N.Y. 121 (1854); Collins l\1fg. Co. 
v. Marcy, 25 Conn. 242 (1855); Warner v. Bennett, 31 Conn. 468 (1863); Gibert v. 
Peteler, 38 N.Y. 165 (1868). 
60 Cowell v. Springs Co., 100 U.S. 55 at 57 (1879). The only cases cited in support 
of these broad assertions are Plumb v. Tubbs, and O'Brien v. Wetherell, note 49 supra, 
which involved conditions against sale of liquor, Gray v. Blanchard, note 43 supra, and 
Doe ex: dem. Bish v. Keeling, I M. & S. 95, 105 Eng. Rep. 36 (1813), which involved 
a condition in a lease for years and so is not in point. Later American cases enforcing 
conditions subsequent imposing use restrictions on estates in fee simple are collected in 
Goldstein, "Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of 
Land," 54 HARv. L. lbw. 248 (1940); Williams, ''Restrictions on the Use of Land; Con-
ditions Subsequent and Determinable Fees," 27 TEX. L. lbw. 158 (1948). 
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though the restrictions imposed are perpetual.51 Such a conclusion 
assumes that rights of entry on condition broken are not subject to the 
Rule Against Perpetuities. Apparently the theory upon which they 
have been excepted from the operation of the rule in this country 
is that they are reversionary interests. This theory is unsound in any 
jurisdiction where the statute Quia Emptores T errarum is in force 
because that statute prohibits the retention of a reversionary interest 
expectant upon a fee simple. Moreover, with rare exceptions, American 
courts have held conditions subsequent enforceable even though 
change of conditions has made continuation of the prescribed use 
worthless to the owner of the right of entry and to the owners of 
neighboring land.52 The decisions are too few to warrant generalization 
as to the American view of the validity of special limitations and 
executory limitations as devices for the imposition of use restrictions,53 
except to note that executory limitations are subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.54 
Probably the American divergence from the salutary principles 
of the ancient common law is due in part to lack of understanding of 
the old law. Coke and Blackstone, the authorities most accessible 
here, devoted less attention to the application of the doctrine of 
repugnancy to conditions and limitations restricting use than to its 
application to direct restraints on alienation. The old reporters were 
hard to find and hard to read. As an American writer has aptly 
observed, 
"Much of modem repugnance to reading the old reporters 
arises, no doubt, from the huge volumes in which they are incar-
cerated, from the hirsute aspect of a Gothic letter, and the other 
inconunodities of an exploded mechanism. If these venerable 
authors were dressed more in the fashion, and made to look like 
ourselves, we should feel less awe in taking them by the hand, and 
.in asking their advice. Indeed, if there were more persons to per-
form the labors so acceptably discharged by the editors of Yelver-
ton, and Latch, and Hobart, it is not easy to believe the profession 
would groan, as it does, under the intolerable burden with which, 
by modem reporters, we are grieved and wearied. We should not 
be made to read, in hundreds of new volumes, the re-decisions of 
51 Note 27 supra; PROPERTY RBSTAT.EMBNT §370, comment e; §372, comment a 
(1944). 
52 Goldstein, "Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrlct the 
Use of Land," 54 HA:a.v. L. RBv. 248 at 266-275 (1940). 
53 The opinion in Spercy's Lessee v. Pond, 5 Ohio 387 (1832), indicates that a 5Pecial 
limitation may be used where a condition subsequent could be. 
54 Note 34 supra; PROPERTY RBsrATEMl!NT §370, comment h; §372, comment a 
(1944). 
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questions perfectly settled by the generations before us. By com-
municating more closely with these spirits of the great departed, 
we should form more modest estimate of our own times; and, in 
the conviction that the intelligence and labors of the dead are as 
sterling as those of the living, should find restraint to that disre-
gard of authority which, in some of our States, has become the 
bane of their jurisprudence."65 
No doubt the American divergence from the wisdom of the old 
common law is to some extent deliberate. The growth of industrial 
cities without public community planning gave rise to a legitimate 
demand for some method of creating residential districts protected 
against the invasion of obnoxious industries and businesses. Until 
the English courts, in the middle of the nineteenth century, invented 
the much more suitable device of the equitable servitude,66 lawyers 
thought of defeasance as one of the few methods known to the law 
which might possibly serve the purpose. So, despite the grave de-
ficencies and serious evils of defeasance as a device for imposing use 
restrictions, its use for the purpose was tolerated. . 
There has also been a negative objection to the old rules. They 
were expressed in terms of the doctrine of repugnancy, which had two 
aspects.67 One aspect was only the obviously necessary rule that when 
a conveyance contains two mutually inconsistent provisions, both 
cannot stand. Thus if Andrew Balcer leases land to John Stiles "for ten 
years, provided that the duration of this lease shall not exceed five 
years," the clauses are inconsistent and one or the other must be 
rejected. This aspect of the repugnancy doctrine involved merely rules 
of construction and does not affect the problem at hand. The other 
aspect of the repugnancy doctrine involved substantive law. At the 
beginning of the thirteenth century the types and incidents of per-
missible estates in land had not been fixed and it seemed possible to 
create an estate of any duration and with any incidents which the 
ingenuity of man might conceive. During that century the courts 
set themselves to limiting the permissible interests in land to a definite 
list of estates, each with fixed and inseparable incidents.58 A necessary 
consequence of this development was a rule that provisions in a con-
veyance tending to deprive the estate granted of essential incidents 
were void as repugnant to the grant.is9 The thirteenth century concept 
liGWALLAc:e, TBB RBPORTEBS, 4th ed., 228, note (1882). 
G6Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); JOLLY, RBsnuCTIVB 
CoVENANTS AI'PECTING LAND, 2d ed., 1 (1931). 
572 SIMEs, I.Aw oit Fonnm !NrERESTs §323 (1936). 
GS "Restraints," 50 MICH. L. RBv. 700, note 102 (1952). 
59 "Restraints," 50 M!CR. L. RBv. 700, note 103 (1952). 
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of restricting the permissible types of interests in land to a fixed list 
of estates with invariable incidents was not congenial to persons im-
bued with nineteenth century views on liberty of contract. To such 
persons it seemed desirable, above all things, to carry out the intention 
of testator or grantor, whether· or not it coincided with the ancient 
scheme of estates, at least unless that intention conflicted with "public 
policy." So the doctrine of repugnancy has been subjected to attack.60 
There is a basic weakness· in much of the nineteenth century 
advocacy of liberty of contract. It was often founded on the fallacious 
assumption that all objectionable restraints on liberty are imposed by 
the state or an established church; that if private persons are only let 
alone by state and church they will be truly free and will not restrict 
each other's liberty objectionably. The disillusionment which has·come 
upon the holders of this optimistic assumption has been mentioned 
in another connection.61 Unquestionably the most seriously evil re-
strictions upon liberty to alienate, develop and use land have been 
imposed by private rather than state action. 62 The belief of the thir-
teenth century judges that the law ought, by fixed and certain rules, 
to restrict the liberty of private persons to impose restrictions on the 
alienation and use of land by others, had a s~und foundation in the 
facts of human character and experience.63 It conceived of liberty in 
a broader sense than did some of the proponents of laissez fa ire and 
sought to use the machinery of the law to protect that broader liberty. 
The Supreme Court of Michigan intimated, before the enactment 
of the Revised Statutes of 1846, that a condition subsequent in a con-
veyance in fee simple, requiring the grantee to indemnify the grantor 
against debts secured by mortgage on the land conveyed, was valid, 
although the forfeiture could not be enforced in equity.64 That con-
dition was, of course, of a type which would have been enforced at the 
ancient common law; it in no way restricted alienation or use of the 
land. Some thirty years later the court handed down its great opinion 
in Mandlebaum 11. McDonell,65 saying that a condition subsequent in 
60 Williams, "The Doct:cine 0£ Repugnancy," 59 L.Q. R.Ev. 343 at 350 (1943). 
61 "Restraints," 50 lvf:rcm:. L. R.Ev. 1033-1037 (1952). 
62 SCRtrITON, LAND IN FETI'l!BS 140-159 (1886). 
as "Restraints," 50 lvf:rcm:. L. REv. 704-705 (1952). 
64Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, l Dougl. 225 (Mich. 1844);, Michigan State 
Bank v. Hammond, 1 Dougl. 527 (Mich. 1845). In the latter case the court.ruled that, 
if the grantor would waive the forfeiture, a decree would enter requiring the grantee to 
hold the land upon constructive trust to the extent necessazy to indemnify the grantor. Cr. 
Waldron v. Toledo, .Ann .Arbor & G.T.R. Co., 55 Mich. 420, 21 N.W. 870 (1885), assum-
ing the validity or a condition subsequent requiring the grantee or a right or way to erect 
a side track within eight months. 
06 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61 (1874), "Restraints," 50 lvf:rcm:. L. R.Ev. 707, note 
138 (1952). 
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a devise in fee simple, restraining all alienation for a limited time, 
was repugnant to the grant and "l[oid because it tended to deprive the 
estate of an inseparable incident and because there can be no remain-
der or .reversion following a fee simple to which the benefit of such 
a restraint can be annexed. 66 
Defeasance as a device for imposing use restrictions was first 
considered here in Barrie v. Smith.67 In 1879 the plaintiffs conveyed 
a village lot in fee simple, subject to a condition subsequent, with ex-
press right of re-entry, against sale of intoxicating liquor. The defend-
ant, a subsequent purchaser of the lot, used it for the operation of a 
saloon. A judgment for the plaintiffs, enforcing the forfeiture, was 
reversed on the ground that the plaintiffs had not shown that ob-
servance of the condition would be of substantial benefit or that its 
breach worked an actual substantial injury to them, and so had failed 
to prove that the condition was not avoided by a Michigan statute 
providing, 
"When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of 
lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual and 
substantial benefit to the party to whom or in whose favor they 
are to be performed, they may be wholly disregarded, and a failure 
to perform the same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the 
lands conveyed subject thereto."68 . 
On a second trial the plaintiffs proved that, at the time of the deed, 
they had owned a mill and a store in the village, that they still owned 
some interest in them, and that the performance of the condition 
tended to ensure the sopriety of employees of these establishments. A 
judgment for the defendant, entered on a directed verdict, was re-
versed in Smith v. Barrie.69 The Michigan Supreme Court, in an 
66 29 Mich. 78 at 91-107, "Restraints," 50 MICH. L. Rlw. 708, note 139 (1952). 
67 47 Mich. 130, 10 N.W. 168 (1881), "Restraints," 50 MxcH. L. Rlw. 709, note 
142 (1952). . 
6S Rev. Stat. (1846), c. 62, §46; Comp. Laws (1857) §2630; Comp. Laws (1871) 
§4113; Comp. Laws (1897) §8828; How. Stat. §5562; Comp. Laws (1915) §11654; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §12966; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.46; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46. The 
decision, in effect, creates a rebuttable presumption that conditions are avoided by the 
statute. Minnesota and Wisconsin have similar statutes. Minn. Stat. (1945) §500.20; 
Wis. Stat. (1949) §230.46. In the former there appears to be a rebuttable presumption 
that conditions are not avoided by the statute. Sioux City & St. P. R.R. v. Singer, 49 Minn. 
301, 51 N.W. 905 (1892). In Abraham v. Stewart, 83 Mich. 7 at 10, 46 N.W. 1030 
(1890), it was said that the benefit must continue to the time of breach. In Johnson v. 
Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N.W. 74 (1889), it was held that the statute has no application 
to conditions in wills. 
69 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). In Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 
N.W. 104 (1885), an injunction against breach of a similar condition was granted at the 
suit of a purchaser from the granter. Both the granter and the _plaintiff owned saloons and 
the benefit. of the condition to them was elimination of competition. But in Chippewa 
Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889), it was said that such a 
condition was in violation of public policy if :imposed to protect a monopoly. 
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opinion by Chief Justice Cooley, brushed aside the contention that the 
condition was repugnant to the grant, suggested that conditions could 
be used to impose restrictions as to building lines, character, height or 
size of buildings, and types of use, and said that conditions are valid 
unless they are against public policy. This "public policy" the opinion 
identified with that which governs the legality of contracts. 
By the decision in Smith 11. Barrie Michigan saddled itself with 
the baneful doctrine, wrong in principle and evil in its results, that 
defeasance is a proper device for imposing use restrictions. Since then, 
much judicial effort has. been devoted to limiting the doctrine and 
trying to prevent its unhappy consequences. The doctrine has been 
limited by decisions refusing to construe the language of conveyances 
as providing for defeasance70 or holding that the event upon which 
the defeasance is to be operative is too indefinite for enforcement.71 
Enforcement has been refused unless the breach is substantial and con-
tinued for an extended period.72 Notice to the violator of the exact 
breach claimed and a reasonable opportunity to terminate the pro-
scribed use has been made a prerequisite to enforcement.73 Waiver of 
the breach and estoppel to assert a forfeiture have been readily found.74 
70 People v. Beaubien, 2 Dougl. 256 (Mich. 1846); Hathaway v. Village of New 
Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882); Adams v. Fh:st Baptist Church of St. 
Charles, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757 (1907); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 
Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Briggs v. Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W. 
555 (1932); Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich. 646, 55 N.W. (2d) 137 (1952). But 
see Blanchard v. Detroit, Lansing & Lake Michigan Railroad Co., 31 Mich. 43 (1875); 
Epworth Assem'bly v. Ludington & Northern Railway, 236 Mich. 565, 211 N.W. 99 
(1926). The reluctance to interpret language as imposing forfeiture evidenced in these 
decisions stands in striking contrast to the readiness displayed in suits to enforce equitable 
servitudes to fuid a manifestation of intention to impose use restrictions. In De Conick v. 
De Conick, 154 Mich. 187, 117 N.W. 570 (1908), a conveyance upon condition subse-
quent was delivered in escrow for delivery to the grantee at the grantor's death.· It was 
held that a 'breach of the condition occurring 'before the grantor's death did not work a 
forfeiture 'because the condition was not operative until the second delivery. 
71 Howlett v. Howlett, 115 Mich. 75, 72 N.W. 1100 (1897). 
'l2 Lemmen v. Allendale Grange No. 421, 201 Mich. 179, 166 N.W. 1003 (1918); 
Ford v. Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425 (1935); Central Land Co. v. Grand 
Rapids, 302 Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485. (1942); Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich. 
646, 55 N.W. (2d) 137 (1952). The deed involved in Central Land Co. v. Grand Rapids 
gave the plaintiff a right of entry if any part of the land was 11Sed for any pmpose except 
park, highway, street or 'boulevard. The grantee was drilling for oil and proposed to 
continue doing so for two more years. It was held that there was no substantial 'breach or 
condition. See Rhines v. Consumers' Power Co., 259 Mich. 236, 242 N.W. 898 (1932). 
'l3Weber v. Ford Motor Co., 245 Mich. 213, 222 N.W. 198 (1928). Citing Treat 
v. Detroit United ~way, 157 Mich. 320, 122 N.W. 93 (1909), a case involving an 
executory land contract. 
74 Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889); Weber 
v. Ford Motor Co., note 73 supra. In Hatch v. Village' of St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 
N.W. 36 (1888), land was conveyed in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent re-
quiring that it be developed as a park within ten years and maintained as such forever. 
Devisees of the grantor, alleging that he and they had been in possession since the convey• 
ance, 'brought a 'bill to quiet title some filty years later. Relief was denied on the ground 
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Such decisions are, of course, only palliatives; they do not prevent a 
grantor who has skilled legal advice from imposing severe restrictions 
on use, which operate as serious indirect restraints on alienation, by 
means of provisions for defeasance. Moreover, such decisions, by mak-
ing it difficult to determine the enforceability of provisions for defea-
sance, make many titles doubtful and a questionable title is in itself an 
indirect restraint on alienation of considerable magnitude. 
In their effort to limit the evil of defeasance as a device for im-
posing use restrictions, the courts returned to ancient common law 
precedents75 and established a rule that rights of entry on breach of 
condition and possibilities of reverter, created in conveyances in fee 
simple, are inalienable inter vivos76 and incapable of being devised 
by \vilJ.77 and that an attempt to alienate a right of entry inter vivos 
destroys it.78 This rule has had the effect of wiping out some of the 
old provisions for defeasance which encumber titles but it adds to the 
evils occasioned by the provisions which it does not destroy. For one 
thing, it tends to preserve the worst provisions for defeasance and 
destroy those which are least objectionable. For example, if Andrew 
Baker, owning Whiteacre and Blackacre, conveys the latter to John 
Stiles and his heirs with a condition providing for forfeiture if any 
oE laches. Act 200, P.A. 1945, Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.1271 to 26.1279; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§565.101 to 565.109, probably extinguishes provisions for defeasance not men-
tioned in any document recorded within forty years. Aigler, "Clearance of Land Titles-
A Statutory Step," 44 M:r01r. L. Imv. 45 at 53 (1945); Basye, "Streamlining Conveyancing 
Procedure," 47 M:rcH. L. Imv. 1097 at 1121 (1949). 
75 It is clear that the common law did not permit alienation oE a :right oE entry, at 
least prior to breach oE the condition. 1 CoXB, !NsnTtIT.ES "'214a (1628). It does not 
appear that an attempt to alienate it destroyed the :right oE entry at common law but the 
Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540), provided that it should. Partridge v. Strange, l 
Plowden 77, 75 Eng. Rep. 123 at 140 (1552); Sir Moyle Finch's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 63a, 
77 Eng. Rep. 348 at 362 (1606); Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester, 8 East 552, 103 
Eng, Rep. 454 (1809). See Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, l Dougl. 19 (Mich. 1843). 
Sir Edward Coke seems to have thought that a possibility oE reverter upon expiration oE a 
fee conveyed subject to a special limitation was alienable but, it not being certain that such 
an interest could exist at common law, this point is equally uncertain. 1 CoXB, INsnnrrns 
"'214b (1628); note 4 supra. 
76 Right oE entry: Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 308, 
194 N.W. 1005 (1923); County oE Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801 
(1928); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); 
Avery v. Consumers' Power Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State 
Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); JuiE v. State Highway 
Commissioner, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938). PosSI"bility oE reverter: Fractional 
School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929). 
11 Puffer v. Clark, 202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 (1918). CE. Hatch v. Village oE 
St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 N.W. 36 (1888). 
78 Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, County oE Oakland v. Mack, 
Avery v. Consumers' Power Co., Dolby v. State Highway Commissioner, JuiE v. State 
Highway Commissioner, note 76 supra. CE. note 75 supra. 
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building over thirteen feet high is ever erected on Blackacre,79 it is 
improbable that this onerous restriction will ever be destroyed by an 
. attempt on the part of Baker or his heirs to transfer the right of entry. 
If, on the other hand, John Stiles, owning Blackacre, conveys a narrow 
strip across his farm to a railroad, with a condition subsequent operative 
upon cessation of railroad use, and a comer of the farm to a school 
district "so long as used for a public school," a subsequent conveyance 
of Blackacre as a whole is quite probable and will destroy the right of 
entry unless the land subject to it is expressly excluded from the con-
veyance. Moreover, in the railroad and school cases, the reverter, if any, 
should be to the owner of Blackacre rather than to Stiles or his heirs. 
If it cannot be made to pass with a conveyance of Blackacre, that farm 
is worth more in the hands of Stiles and his heirs than in those of a 
purchaser and the rule of inalienability acts as an indirect restraint on 
the alienation of the whole farm. 
The rule that rights of entry and possibilities of reverter are inalien-
able and cannot be devised tends to make their elimination much more 
difficult in this country than in sixteenth century England. Under the 
rule of primogeniture the heir of a grantor who had conveyed on 
condition subsequent was almost always a single individual, readily 
ascertainable, who could release the right of entry to the owner of 
the burdened land. Under our statutes of descent, the heirs of the 
grantor are likely to be very numerous after several generations. No 
effective release can be secured without locating and securing the 
joinder of all of them.80 In sum, the rule that rights of entry and 
possibilities of reverter are inalienable, adopted in an effort to alleviate 
the evil effects of provisions for defeasance used to impose use restric-
tions, probably aggravates those evil effects. 
A Michigan statute, enacted in 1931, provides, 
"The reversionary interest in lands conveyed on a condition 
subsequent may be granted, conveyed, transferred or devised by 
the owner of such interest, and by the subsequent grantees or 
devisees thereof, either before or after the right of re-entry be-
comes effective: Provided, That this act shall not affect any such 
interest created before it takes effect."81 
79 LEA.cm, CASES AND MA.TEB.IAI.S ON Fannm !NrnnESTs, 2d. ed., 50, note 25 (1940), 
states that such a condition, nnposed originally to enable the granter to watch his cattle 
grazing, still encumbers the title to land in a closely built upon section of Boston. 
so In Puffer v. Clark, note 77 supra, it was suggested, but not decided, that the heirs 
of the grantor are to be determined at the time of the breach of condition rather than at 
his death. If this is so, the owner of the burdened estate may never know when he has 
secured releases from the right "heirs." 
81 Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.851; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.111, 
effective September 18, 1931. 
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This statute does not affect the inalienability of a right of entry· 
on breach of a condition subsequent contained in a conveyance exe-
cuted before September 18, 1931,82 and it does not appear to extend 
to possibilities of reverter. 
Apart from the railroad and timber cases, which require special 
consideration, the writer has found only one Michigan case in which, 
under the doctrine of Smith 11. Barrie,83 a provision for defeasance 
imposing use restrictions, in a conveyance in fee simple to a grantee 
who was not a public or charitable corporation, has actually been 
enforced. Estes 11. Muskegon County Agricultural & Driving Park 
Association84 was an action of ejectment. In 1875 the plaintiff and his 
wif~ conveyed the land to the defendant by a deed providing that it 
should "be used for the purposes of fair grounds and driving park 
and for no other purpose, and to revert to said first parties, their heirs 
and assigns when abandoned by said second party for the purpose afore-
said." The permitted use was discontinued in 1902, the plaintiff de-
manded possession in 1910, and he commenced the action in 1911. 
He having died before trial, a judgment in favor of his heirs was 
affirmed. The doctrine of Smith 11. Barrie has been a potent source of 
litigation, but there is no indication in the cases that it has ever, in even 
a single instance, served its ostensible purpose of permitting the creation 
of desirable residential districts. 
It will be recalled that, under the English common law, a condi-
tion subsequent requiring removal within a limited time, in an other-
wise outright conveyance of standing timber, was void as repugnant 
to the grant.85 In Michigan such a condition is valid and the right 
of entry on breach of it is alienable with the Iand.86 These special 
rules as to timber are inconsistent both with the common law and with 
the Michigan rules as to alienability of rights of entry. They do have 
some justification in public policy, as the enforcement of such a condi-
tion in a sale of timber tends to free the land itself from an encum-
s2 nolby v. State Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938). 
88 Note 69 supra. 
84181 Mich. 71, 147 N.W. 553 (1914). Cf. note 74 supra. In McClanahan Oil 
Co. v. Perkins, 303 Mich. 448, 6 N.W. (2d) 742 (1942), a gas lease for five years and as 
long thereafter as gas "is or can be produced" was treated as valid but the special limitation 
had not expired. 
85Note 16 supra. 
80 Haskell v. Ayres, 32 Mich. 93 (1875); Utley v. S. N. Wilcox Lumber Co., 59 
Mich. 263, 26 N.W. 488 (1886); Williams v. Flood, 63 Mich. 487, 30 N.W. 93 (1886); 
Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510, 52 N.W. 941 (1892); Macomber v. Detroit:, Lansing & 
Northern R.R. Co., 108 Mich. 491, 66 N.W. 376 (1896); Harrington v. Kneeland-
Bigelow Co., 213 Mich. 327, 182 N.W. 68 (1921); Broadwell v. Walker, 216 Mich. 210, 
184 N.W. 866 (1921). Cf. Monroe v. Bowen, 26 Mich. 523 (1873); Richards v. Tozer, 
27 Mich. 451 (1873); Johnson v. Moore, 28 Mich. 3 (1873); Haskell v. Ayres, 35 Mich. 
89 (1876). 
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brance and there are certainly advantages to reuniting the title to the 
timber with that to the land. Moreover, the same effect could be ob-
tained under the English law by a conveyance of a profit in gross for 
a limited term and there are disadvantages to thwarting an unobjection-
able purpose because not expressed in appropriate technical language. 
Since 1855 the general statutes governing incorporation of rail-
roads have provided that land donated to a railroad shall be held and 
used for the purposes of the grant only.87 Earlier special acts incorporat-
ing railroads did not contain similar provisions.88 Since 1887 the 
statutes have provided that when a railroad track ceases to be used, the 
railroad must convey donated lands ''to the person, persons, or corpora-
tion from whom it was received, or to his or its heirs, assigns, executors, 
administrators, or successors."89 It thus appears that the use of land 
donated to railroads is restricted by statute and breach of the statutory 
restriction entails forfeiture. As has been seen, at the English common 
law, a condition subsequent restraining a type of alfenation or use 
which would be wr<;mgful in the absence of the condition is not renug-
nant to the grant.00 flence it would seem, upon principle, that a cotdi-
tion subsequent entitling the grantor to enter upon cessation of use 
for railroad purposes should be valid in a.,donatilze. conveyance executed 
after 1855 but not in a conveyance in fee simple given for a valuable 
consideration. Such conditions have been enforced whether the con-
veyance was by way of sale91 or by way of gift92 and the judicial 
opinions involving them make no distinction between the two.93 
8'1 Act 82, P.A. 1855, §17, 112; Act 198, 1873, §9, 112; How. Stat. §3323; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §6234; Comp. Laws (1915) §8243; Comp. Laws (1929) §11121; Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §22.212; Comp. Laws (1948) §464.9. 
SBSpecial acts of incorporation were prohibited by CoNST. 1850, art. 15, §1, and 
CoNST. 1908, art. XII, §l. Special acts incorporating railroads tended to provide that title 
acquired by condemnation should be on special limitation, "so long as used for railroad 
purposes," but did not limit the title acquired by gift or purchase. Act 109, 1837, §12; Act 
111, 1837, §12; Act 118, 1837, §12; Act 12, 1837 Ext. Sess., §12; Act 74, 1838, §12; Act 
84, 1838, §12; Act 94, 1838, §12; Act 96, 1838, §12; Act 42, 1846, §7; Act 98, 1846, 
§11; Act 104, 1846, §10; Act 113, 1846, §8; Act 137, 1846, §12; Act 154, 1846, §11; Act 
5, 1847, §15; Act 152, 1848, §10; Act 199, 1848, §15; Act 234, 1848, §15; Act 274, 
1850, §15. Some of the xailroads were built by the state on land acquired by it and later 
sold to private corporations. E.g., Act 42, 1846 (Michigan Central Rail Road); Act 113, 
1846 (Michigan Southern Rail Road). 
89 Act 275, 1887; How. Stat. §3457a; Comp. Laws (1897) §6347; Comp. Laws 
(1915) §8363; Comp. Laws (1929) §11353; Mich. Stat. Ann. §22.591; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §469.221. The language of the statute appears to extend to gifts made before its 
enactment. CoNST. 1850, art. 15, §12, and CoNST. 1908, art. XII, §5, prohibit retention 
by a corporation for more than ten years of land not actually occupied in the exercise of 
its franchises. 
90 "Restraints," 50 MiCH. L. REv. 731, notes 217, 218 (1952); notes 20, 22 supra. 
, 91 Hickox v. Chicago & Canada Southern Railway Co., 78 Mich. 615, 44 N.W. 143 
(1889). 
i 92 Hawkins v. Dillman, 268 Mich. 483, 256 N.W. 492 (1934). 
93 Notes 91, 92 supra, 94 infra; Detroit v. Detroit & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 23 Mich. 
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If forfeiture is justifiable in such cases it should be to the owner 
of the contiguous land. The 1887 act appears to recognize this by 
requiring conveyance to the "assigns" of the original grantor. As to 
conditions subsequent, restricting to railroad use, in conveyances made 
before 1931, however, the right of entry has been held to be inalienable 
and destroyed by an attempt at transfer.94 The result of this rule 
is most unhappy. Suppose Andrew Baker conveyed a strip through 
his farm, Blackacre, to a railroad in 1930, subject to a condition subse-
quent operative on cessation of railroad use. In 1954 it is apparent 
that, because of competition of truck lines, the railroad will soon be 
abandoned. John Stiles wishes to purchase Blackacre and, naturaily, 
to get the strip now used by the railroad if that use ceases. If Andrew 
sells Blackacre to him without excepting the right of entry, the right 
,vill be destroyed and the reunion of the strip vvith the farm prevented. 
If Andrew sells, excepting the right of entry, it will be Andrew or his 
heirs who will have the right of entry when railroad use ceases, again 
preventing reunion of the strip with the farm. 
Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal Railway Co.95 was a suit to 
remove a cloud from title. In I 901 Russell and Boltwood granted. 
a right of way for railroad purposes, 50 feet wide, over land owned 
by them to Buttars, trustee for a railroad, the deed providing that if a 
railroad should not be erected within three years or if such railroad 
should not be operated for a year, title should revert to the grantors, 
their heirs or assigns. In 1902 Russell and Boltwood conveyed the 
whole tract of land to the plaintiff, "excepting the conditional right of 
way heretofore granted to the Ludington Railroad Company." The 
condition was breached. A decree for the plaintiff was affirmed. The 
opinion states that the 1901 grant conveyed only an easement, that the 
fee subject to the easement was alienable, that its alienation did not 
destroy the power of termination, and that the plaintiff, as purchaser 
of the fee subject to the easement, was entitled to enforce the condition 
subsequent. Such a grant would not have created an easement in 
173 (1871); Treat v. Detroit United Railway, 157 lvlich. 320, 122 N.W. 93 (1909); 
Epworth Assembly v. Ludington & Northern Railway, 236 lvlich. 565, 211 N.W. 99 
(1926); Weber v. Ford Motor Co., 245 lvlich. 213, 222 N.W. 198 (1928); Rhines v. 
Consumers' Power Co., 259 lvlich. 236, 242 N.W. 898 (1932). But see Quinn v. Pere 
Marquette Railway Co., 256 l\fich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931). 
4'!,Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); 
Avery v. Consumers Power Co., 265 lvlich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State 
Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State Highway 
Commissioner, 287 lvlich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938). 
o:; 174 lvlich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913). See Quinn v. Pere Marquette Railway 
Co., 256 lvlich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931). Cf. Badeaux v. Ryerson, 213 lvlich. 642, 
182 N.W. 22 (1921). 
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England because it conferred a right of exclusive possession, which is a 
possessory estate, not a servitude. Assuming that the interest granted 
in 1901 was an easement, the decision would be justifiable on principle 
if the restriction were by special limitation. As it was by condition 
subsequent, it is difficult to reconcile the case with those cited in the 
preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, the result reached is much happier 
than those which they effected. 
It will be recalled that, under the English common law, a condition 
subsequent restricting use was valid in a conveyance to a public or 
charitable corporation, providing the conditional event was bound to 
happen, if at all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.96 
The common law Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to con-
veyances of Michigan land made between 1847 and 1949.97 In 1942 
the Michigan Supreme Court actually enforced a defeasance upon 
expiration of a special limitation made in 1864 "so long as occupied 
for school purposes."98 In a number of other cases it has assumed the 
validity of conditions subsequent and special limitations restricting 
land conveyed in fee to public or charitable uses, whether the con-
veyance was made before99 or after 1847,1°0 without regard to the 
duration of the restriction. 
Village of Grosse Pointe Shores 11. Ayres 101 was a suit for a 
96 Notes 26, 27 supra. 
97Wincliate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); ''Restraints," 50 MICH. 
L. Rmr. 734, note 231 (1952). 
98 Thomas v. Jewell, 300 Mich. 556, 2 N.W. (2d) 501 (1942). 
99Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870) (conveyance to city for public square); 
Hatch v. Village oE St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 N.W. 36 (1888) (condition subsequent 
in conveyance to city for public park); County oE Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 
N.W. 801 (1928) (condition subsequent in conveyance to county for court house). 
100 Hathaway v. Village oE New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882) 
(bequest to village for high school); School District No. 5 oE Delhi v. Everett, 52 Mich. 
314, 17 N.W. 926 (1883) (special limitation in conveyance to school district); Adams v. 
First Baptist Church oE St. Charles, 148 Mich. 140, Ill N.W. 757 (1907) (devise to 
church for parsonage); Puffer v. Clark, 202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 (1918) (condition 
subsequent in conveyance for home for retired clergymen); Halpin v. Rural Agricultural 
School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923) (condition subsequent in 
conveyance to school district); Trustees oE the M. J. Clark Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240 
Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927) (same conveyance involved in Puffer v. Clark); Frac-
tional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929) (special 
limitation in conveyance to school district); Bruce v. Henry Ford Hospital, 254 Mich. 394, 
236 N.W. 813 (1931) (condition subsequent in conveyance to charitable hospital); Briggs 
v. Grand Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W. 555 (1932) (conveyance to city for park); 
Ford v. Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425 (1935) (condition subsequent in convey-
ance to city for park between lanes oE a street); Central Land Co. v. Grand Rapids, 302 
Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485 (1942) (condition subsequent in conveyance to city for 
park, highway, street or boulevard purposes); Clark v. Grand Rapids, 334 Mich. 646, 55 
N.W. (2d) 137 (1952) (condition subsequent in conveyance to trustee for public park 
purposes). 
101254 Mich. 58, 235 N.W. 829 (1931). See Dickerson v. Detroit, 99 Mich. 498 
at 501, 58 N.W. 645 (1894). CE. Leggett v. Detroit, 137 Mich. 247, 100 N.W. 566 
(1904); Ford v. Detroit, note 100 supra. 
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declaratory judgment. The defendants conveyed land to the plaintiff 
village for highway purposes by a deed providing that there should 
be two driveways with a parkway between and on each side and that 
no sidewalk, sewer, water main or underground public utility conduit 
should occupy the east parkway. The deed further provided that title 
should revert to the grantors, their heirs, executors, administrators or 
assigns upon breach of these restrictions. It was held that the restric-
tions were void as against public policy and repugnant to the grant 
in that they were an attempt to oust municipal control of highways. 
This decision may evidence some tendency to look again with respect 
upon the ancient doctrine of repugnancy which was so readily brushed 
aside in Smith v. Barrie.102 
Since 1925 the statutes have provided, 
"Whenever any lands shall heretofore or hereafter be con-
veyed by any grant or devise to be held or used for any religious, 
educational, charitable, benevolent or public purpose, with a con-
dition annexed in the instrument of conveyance that in event said 
lands shall at any time cease to be held or used for the purpose 
set forth in such conveyance, title thereto shall revert to the 
grantor or devisor and his heirs, and . . . it shall appear to the 
satisfaction of the court that . . . because of changed conditions 
or circumstances since the execution of such conveyance it is im-
possible or impracticable to longer hold or use said lands for the 
purposes limited in such conveyance and that the religious, edu-
cational, charitable, benevolent, or public object of the grantor, 
as set forth in such conveyance, may be defeated thereby, a decree 
may be entered authorizing the grantor [sic] to sell such lands 
... , and clirecting that the proceeds of the sale of such lands shall 
be reinvested in other lands suitable for the use or purpose set forth 
in the original conveyance, which lands shall thereupon be held 
by the grantee named in the original conveyance subject to the 
same limitations as set forth therein. . 
"No sale of lands under the decree of the court as herein 
provided shall defeat the estate of the grantee named in the origi-
nal conveyance because of the failure to longer hold or use the 
same for the purpose named in such conveyance and shall be 
sufficient to convey to the purchaser of such lands a good and 
sufficient title in fee simple, free from all conditions or limita-
tions whatsoever, under which the same shall theretofore have 
been held or used."103 
102 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885), note 69 supra. 
103Act 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann 
§§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to 554.404; also discussed in "Re-
straints," 50 Mica. L. Rnv. 733 (1952). 
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The statute prohibits action under it within ten years from the 
execution of the conveyance on condition or in the lifetime of the 
grantor.104 The provision that the proceeds of the statutory sale shall 
be invested in other lands which will then be subject to the pro-
vision for defeasance of the original conveyance, may have peculiar 
results. For example, if a farmer conveys a comer of his farm to a 
school district, subject to a condition restricting it to school use, the 
consolidated school movement may result in the farmer's son acquiring 
a right of entry in the site of some consolidated school twenty miles 
away, instead of getting the comer of the farm back when it is no 
longer used for a school. Conveyances for highway or sewer purposes 
may cause similar peculiar results. Probably the statute applies to 
special limitations as well as to conditions subsequent. It does not 
apply to conditional limitations of shifting executory interests. How-
ever, as has been seen, a shifting executory interest, unless to another 
charity, must comply with the Rule Against_ Perpetuities. 
Whatever its demerits, the statute is a partial legislative recog-
nition of the fact that defeasance is no. longer an appropriate method 
of enforcing the terms of public and charitable gifts. Michigan 
refused to enforce charitable trusts until they were authorized by 
statute in 1907.105 Consequently, prior to 1907, defeasance was the 
only available device for ensuring that a public or charitable donation 
was used for the intended purpose. Now that charitable trusts are 
valid and enforceable at the suit of the attorney general, enforcement 
by defeasance is rarely desirable. Private enforcement of charitable 
gifts, like qui-tam actions and private criminal prosecutions, is a relic 
of a period when executive government was too weak or too inefficient 
to enforce public rights. Public rights should be enforced by public 
authority, not by.private persons motivated by whim or avarice. 
As has been seen, the American doctrine that defeasance may be 
used as a device for imposing use restrictions on land conveyed in 
fee simple to private persons, arose at a time when the growth of 
industry and cities seemed to demand some method of excluding 
obnoxious activities from residential districts and no better device was 
104Sec. 2. 
10s Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 
(1879); Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896); 
Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 
126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908); McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, 118 N.W. 985 (1909); 
Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910). Charitable trusts were 
authorized by Act 122, P.A. 1907, superseded by Act 280, P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915) 
§11099; Comp. Laws (1929) §13512; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.1191; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§554.351. Trusts for public welfare purposes were authorized by Act 373, P.A. 1925, 
Comp. Laws (1929) §13517; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.1201; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.381. 
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known to the bar. In the middle of the nineteenth century the English 
courts invented a much more suitable device to accomplish the purpose, 
the equitable servitude. It is more suitable because it does not involve 
a forfeiture, if does not involve enforcement of use restrictions which 
have become obsolete and worthless due to change of circumstances, 
enforcement does not destroy the restrictions, and the benefit of the 
restrictions is appurtenant to the land protected by the restrictions. 
The equitable servitude use restriction has been developed elaborately 
by the courts of Michigan. The doctrine that defeasance is a usable 
mode of imposing use restrictions on privately owned land is in 
conflict with the principles of the common law, works harsh, in-
equitable results, and is no longer useful. Michigan would do well 
to abolish it by overruling Smith v. Barrie106 and the one decision 
following it.107 Refusal to enforce provisions for defeasance as such 
would not prevent the enforcement as equitable servitudes of the 
restrictions on use intended to be imposed by such provisions.108 
Estates for Life and for Years 
Estates for life and for years differ from estates in fee simple 
in that there is always a remainder or reversion which will become 
possessory upon their expiration. The remaindennan or reversioner has 
a very real interest in the character of the tenant in possession and 
in the type of use which he makes of the land. This interest in the 
character of the tenant is recognized in the rules which permit penalty 
restraints on alienation of estates for life and years, even though they 
restrain all alienation.109 The interest of the remaindennan or re-
versioner in the type of use made of the land had explicit statutory 
recognition at an early date. The Statute of Marlebridge forbade 
tennors to commit waste without special license and subjected them 
to liability in damages for doing so.110 The Statute of Gloucester 
provided that a tenant for life or years who committed waste should 
100 Note 102 supra. 
107Estes v. Muskegon County Agricultural & Driving Park Assn., 181 Mich. 71, 147 
N.W. 553 (1914). 
10s watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885), note 69 supra. 
109 ''Restraints," 50 MrCH. L. R:Ev. 795-796, 808-809 (1952). 
110 52 Hen. m, c. 23, §2 (1267): "Also Fermors, during their Terms, shall not make 
Waste, Sale, nor Exile oE Houses, Woods, Men, nor oE any Thing belonging to the Tene-
ments that they have to ferm, without SPecial Licence had by writing of Covenant, making 
mention that they may do it; which thing iE they do, and thereof be convict, they shall 
yield £ull Damage, and shall be punished by Amerciament grievously." "Fermors" included 
all lessees for life or years. 2 Co:im, INsnnr.rns 145 (1641). 
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pay triple damages and forfeit the place wasted.111 The term wa~te 
included not only destructive activities which injured the reversion or 
remainder, such as destroying buildings, cutting timber or opening 
mines, but also failure to maintain or repair the premises and any 
substantial change in their existing appearance or use. It was waste 
to convert arable land to timber or vice versa, to enlarge a house, or 
to change the location of fences. In short, the tenant for life or years 
might continue to use the land in the precise manner in which it was 
used when his tenancy began but might not make any change in the 
use without express license.112 So far as use is concerned, such an 
estate had very little in the way of essential incidents. 
As in the case of conveyances in fee simple, a provision for de-
feasance in a lease for life or years which operated to deprive the estate 
demised of an essential incident, was void as repugnant to the grant. 
Thus a condition subsequent in a lease for life that the tenant, or some 
of the tenants, should not occupy the Iand118 or should not take the 
profits114 was repugnant and void, even though . the restriction was 
limited in duration to something less than the full term of the lease. 
Likewise, a condition in a lease for years restraining the lessee from 
occupying the premises during part of the term116 or denying him the 
use of part of the demised premises,116 was invalid. Apart from these 
extreme provisions, penalizing any use whatever, however, the English 
courts have enforced provisions for defeasance in leases for life and 
years, which impose use restrictions. Thus conditions subsequent in 
leases for years restraining the lessee from committing waste117 or 
cutting timber,118 requiring him to keep the premises in repair,119 
restricting use of the premises to a particular type of business,120 
restricting against a particular type of business,121 or restraining use 
111 6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278). Tenants in aower, by the curtesy and in guardianship were 
punishable for waste at common law. These statutes extended such liability to ordinaty 
tenants for life and years but left the definition of waste to the common law. 2 CoXB, 
!NSTlTl'.lTBs 299-301 (1641). · 
112 1 Cox:s, lNSTITaTEs *52b-54b (1628). 
11a Scovel v. Cabe!, Cro. Eliz. 89, pL 13, 107, pl. I, 78 Eng. Rep. 347 at 365 (1589). 
114 Plesington's Case, Bellewe 284, 72 Eng. Rep. 124 at 125 (1382); Moore v. Savil, 
2 Leonard 132, pl. 176, 74 Eng. Rep. 419 (1585). 
115 See Moore v. Savil, note 114 supra; Scovel v. Cabel, note 113 supra. Cf. Vincent 
Lee's Case, 3 Leonard 110, 74 Eng. Rep. 573 (1584). 
116 See Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 at 317 (1614). Cf. 
Homeby v. Clifton, 3 Dyer 264b, 73 Eng. Rep. 586 (1567); Welcden v. Elkington, 2 
Plowden 516, 75 Eng. Rep. 763 at 775 (1578). 
117 Abbot of Shirbume's Case, Y.B. 12 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 11 (1410). 
118 Anonymous, Moore K.B. 49, pl. 149, 72 Eng. Rep. 433, Dal. 49, pl. 12, 123 Eng. 
Rep. 263 (1563). 
119 Penton v. Barnett, [1898] 1 Q.B. 276. 
120Timms v. Baker, 49 L.T. 106 (Q.B. Div. 1883) (wine, spirit or ale merchant). 
121 Toleman v. Portbury, L.R. 5 Q.B. 288 (1870) (auctions). 
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for any business not approved by the lessor,122 have been treated as 
valid. Such proscribed uses are probably within the broad common law 
definition of waste. The English courts have also treated as valid 
provisions for defeasance, in leases for life or years, if the lessee fails 
to reside upon the demised land.123 As failing to live on the land was 
not waste at common law, these last decisions must indicate that while, 
ordinarily, a tenant for life or years is free to reside where he chooses, 
such a restriction does not deprive the estate of an essential, inseparable 
incident. This suggests that, for purposes of applying the doctrine of 
repugnancy, these lesser estates are looked upon as having virtually 
no essential incidents of use except that of some kind of use. In this 
connection it will be recalled that, in the thirteenth century, a lease 
for years did not create an estate in Ian~ at all but only a license to 
use, based upon conract, and strictly limited to the privileges expressly 
conferred.124 
One of the reasons why defeasance in favor of the grantor is not 
a suitable device for imposing use restrictions in a conveyance in fee 
simple is that rights of entry and possibilities of reverter are personal 
interests which cannot be conveyed with or made appurtenant to the 
land benefited by the restrictions. In the case of a lease for life or 
years on special limitation (e.g., "to Jane Stiles so long as she remains a 
widow and makes her home upon the demised land"; "to John Stiles 
for twenty years if he shall so long dwell upon the demised land,") 
the interest retained by the lessor is not a mere possibility of reverter 
but a reversion, which is an estate in the land and freely alienable.125 
Restrictions in a lease enure to the benefit of the reversion and the 
o,vner of the reversion is entitled to take possession when an estate for 
life or years expires by special limitation. A right of entry on breach 
of a condition subsequent in a lease for life, however, is not part of 
the reversion. At common law such a right of entry was personal to 
the lessor and could only be exercised by him, even after he had con-
veyed the reversion to another and so no longer had any interest 
in the demised land.126 This rule was changed by a statute of 1540 
122Doe ex dem. Bish v. Keeling, 1 M. & S. 95, 105 Eng. Rep. 36 (1813). 
123 Chickeley's Case, 1 Dyer 77a, 73 Eng. Rep. 169 (1553) (condition subsequent 
in lease for years); Doe ex dem. Lockwood v. Clarke, 8 East 185, 103 Eng. Rep. 313 
(1807) (special limitation in lease for years); Wynne v. Fletcher, 24 Beav. 430, 53 Eng. 
Rep. 423 (1857) (executozy devise on devise of life estate); 1 CoKB, !Nsnxarn,; *204a 
(1628). 
124 "Restxaints," 50 MxcH. L. REv. 807, note 286 (1952). Cf. Statute of Marlebridge, 
52 Hen. ill, c. 23, §2 (1267), note 110 supra. 
1251 CoKB, !NST1TOTEs *214h (1628); 1 CRmsB, REAL PROPERTY, 1st Amer. ed., 
title XIlI, §65 (1808). 
126 Anonymous, Y.B. 11 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 14 (1495); 1 CoKB, !Nsnnrr.as *214b• 
215a (1628). These authorities state that where a lease for years provided that it would 
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which empowered grantees of the reversion to enforce conditions subse-
quent in leases for life or years.127 
Leases differ from conveyances in fee in another respect. As a 
purchaser in fee usually pays the whole value of the land at the time 
of his purchase, forfeiture of his estate is a very harsh and severe 
penalty for breach of a use restriction. Lessees, on the other· hand, 
usually pay rent on a monthly or annual basis, the rental payments 
made in any period approximating the use value of the land for that 
period. If the lessor elects to enforce a condition subsequent, the 
lessee forfeits his estate but he is relieved from further payment of 
rent. Hence, ordinarily forfeiture of a lease is not so severe a penalty 
as that of an estate in fee in that it does not deprive the tenant of 
that for which he has already paid or unjustly enrich the lessor. The 
early cases showed as much reluctance to find a provision for forfeiture 
in a lease as in a conveyance in fee.128 It came to be recognized, how-
ever, that, because the right of enforcement is appurtenant to the 
reversion and because forfeiture is not usually so severe a penalty, 
defeasance in favor of the lessor is not so unsuitable a method of 
imposing use restrictions in a lease as in a conveyance in fee. Hence, 
modem cases do not tend to distort the language of a lease in order 
to avoid finding a condition subsequent.129 
The Michigan Revised Statutes of 1838 provided that any tenant 
for life or years who committed or suffered waste should forfeit his 
estate and pay single damages.130 The Revised Statutes of 1846 
eliminated the provision for forfeiture but imposed liability for double 
damages for waste.131 The English statute of 1540 has not been 
reenacted here but, nevertheless, it would seem that a right of entry 
on breach of condition subsequent is appurtenant to the reversion and 
exercisable by a purchaser of the reversion, whether the estate subject to 
be void upon the happening of. an event, it terminated automatically when the event 
happened, so that an assignee of the revexsion could take advantage of the forfeiture. 
127 32 Hen. VIlI, c. 34, §1 (1540). See Winter's Case, 3 Dyer 308b, 73 Eng. Rep. 
697 (1572), New York has a virtually identical statute. Real Property Law §223. 
l2SE.g. Machel and Dunton's Case, 2 Leon. 33, 74 Eng. Rep. 335 (1587). 
129 Goodtitle ex dem. Luxmore v. Saville, 16 East 87, 104 Eng. Rep. 1022 at 1025 
(1812); 1 CoICS, !NsnTOT.Es *204a (1628). 
130p, 496. 
131 C. 110, §§1, 6; Comp. Laws (1857) §§4698, 4703; Comp. Laws (1871) §§6353, 
6358; How. Stat. §§7940, 7945; Comp. Laws (1897) §§11116, 11121; Comp. Laws (1915) 
§§14940, 14945; Comp. Laws (1929) §§15115, 15120; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§27.2141, 
27.2146; Comp. Laws (1948) §§692.401, 692.406. Section I substantially reenacts the 
Statute of Marlebridge, note 110 5\lpra. 
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the condition is for life132 or years,133 even though the lease was 
executed after the repeal of the English statutes in 1810 and before 
the enactment in 1931 of the Michigan statute making rights of entry 
alienable.134 
It was so well settled in England that provisions for forfeiture de-
signed to enforce use restrictions in leases for life or years are lawful 
that the question of their validity has rarely been raised here. A special 
limitation in a lease for life, requiring the lessee to occupy the land, 
has been treated as valid.135 Provisions in leases for years requiring 
the lessee personally to work the farm leased, on penalty of forfeiture, 
have been enforced,136 as has a condition subsequent in a lease of an 
apartment, entitling the lessor to reenter if a dog was kept on the 
demised premises.137 The language of a number of opinions seems to 
assume the validity of provisions for forfeiture on breach of covenants 
in leases for years restricting use of the premises to farrning,138 to par-
ticular businesses139 or against sale of liquor. 140 In Negaunee Iron 
Company -v. Iron Cliffs Co.141 it was held that a provision in a 99-year 
mining lease that the lessee should not mine ore "except such as it 
shall actually convert into merchantable iron in its own furnaces or 
forges," was a special limitation which caused the lease to expire when 
the lessee ceased to. have a furnace in the vicinity. 
It thus appears that, as to provisions for defeasance in leases for life 
and years, the law of Michigan is the same as that of England: they 
may be used to impose use restrictions. A provision for defeasance in 
a lease for the life of a living person never violates the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, but, in view of the brevity of human life, a restriction 
132 Hamilton v. Wickson, 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902); Hess v. Haas, 230 
Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925); 3 Sn.ms, LAw OF FtJTDRB hmmllsTs 162 (1936). 
133 Patterson v. Carrel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912); Miller v. Pond, 214 
Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921). 
134Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.851; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.111; 
"Restraints," 50 MICH. L. Rnv. 830, note 374 (1952); note 81 sup:ra. 
135 Larlverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897), discussed in ''Restraints," 
50 MICH. L. Rnv. 800-802 (1952). See Hess v. Haas, 230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 
(1925). 
13s Randall v. Chubb, 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881); Lewis v. Sheldon, 103 
Mich. 102, 61 N.W. 269 (1894). Cf. Gravenburgh v. McKeough, 117 Mich. 555, 76 
N.W. 77 (1898); Vincent v. Crane, 134 Mich. 700, 97 N.W. 34 (1903); Lowe v. 
Radecke, 204 Mich. 646, 171 N.W. 408 (1919); McPheetexs v. Birkholz, 232 Mich. 370, 
205 N.W. 196 (1925). 
l37F.irst Mortgage Bond Co. v. Saxton, 312 Mich. 520, 20 N.W. (2d) 294 (1945). 
138 Cronin v. Ochadleus, 308 Mich. 596, 14 N.W. (2d) 509 (1944). 
139 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Hilsendegen v. Hartz 
Clothing Co., 165 Mich. 255, 130 N.W. 646 (1911). 
140 Hammond v. Hibbler, 168 Mich. 66, 133 N.W. 932 (1911). 
141134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1903); ''Restraints," 50 MICH. L. Iu.v. 816, note 
323 (1952). 
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in such a lease cannot endure for a very extended period. In the 
mediaeval period, when the incidents of estates were becoming fixed 
and the validity of provisions for defeasance determined, the estate 
for years was a precarious interest because the owner of the fee could 
destroy it by suffering a collusive common recovery.142 Consequently, 
leases for long terms of years were virtually unknown. A statute of 
1529 empowered tenants for years to hold their estates in spite of such 
recoveries143 and so made estates for years much more valuable and 
dependable interests. Leases for terms of five hundred and a thousand 
years became common and it was suggested that a provision for de-
feasance upon the happening of an uncertain event, in such a long-term 
lease, was subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. The courts had 
considerable doubt about the question but eventually decided that, 
when a vested reversion or remainder is expectant upon the expiration 
of a term of years, the fact that the estate for years is defeasible upon 
the occurrence of an event which may not happen within the period of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities, does not invalidate the estate for years, 
the reversion or remainder, or the provision for defeasance.144 Conse-
quently, provisions for defeasance in leases for long terms of years may 
be used to impose use restrictions which will continue for centuries, 
regardless of the fact that changed conditions may make enforcement 
of the restrictions undesirable. This possibility is a potential evil which 
the legislature might well consider rectifying.145 
1421 CoKE, lNSTITUTl!s 46a (1628). See Wind v. Jekyl, 1 P. Wms. 572, 24 Eng. 
Rep. 522 at 523 (1719). The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 11 (1278), 2 Cox:s, 
lNSTrroTEs 321-324 (1641), empowered certain urban lessees to attack such collusive 
recoveries. 
14s 21 Hen. VllI, c. 15, §3 (1529). 
144 Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722); Wood v. Drew, 33 Beav. 
610, 55 Eng. Rep. 505 (1864); Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 572, 2 N.W. 814 
(1879); GRAY, RtJLE AGAINo:r P.BRPllTtllTIES, 3d ed., §209 (1915). Section 4 of the 
Marketable Title Act, Act 200, P.A. 1945, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.1274; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §565.104, excepts the interests of reversioners under leases from the provisions of 
that act which extinguish interests not mentioned in any document recorded within forty 
years. 
145 CoNST. 1908, art. XVI, §10, limits ihe duration of leases or agricultu:tal land for 
agricultural purposes, reserving rent or services, to twelve years. Compare ihe similar sug-
gestion as to restraints on alienation in leases for long terms of years, ''Restraints," 50 
:M':rCEr. L. Blw. 824-825 (1952). The problem is one for legislation because, unlike that 
as to use restrictions on estates in fee, the courts have no historical precedents for overruling 
their decisions. 
